You seem to be taking the entire industry down by painting broad strokes from one incident; yet somehow planes aren't crashing everyday so. Anyway I don't work in the field but what I've read, issues with the 737 MAX were not software related - they were and are design related. They need redundant sensors. Their overall design approach was due to their desire not to have pilots go through additional training and the fact that they didn't have redundant sensors is criminal or a disagree alert standard were criminally negligent decisions in my opinion. Those are also largely system design related decisions; not software engineers.
"In practice, the MCAS system accepted readings from only a single angle of attack (AOA) sensor. In the event of a bad sensor reading, the MCAS initiated repeated nose-down inputs. The cockpit alarm for AOA disagreement was also an expensive upcharge.
So Boeing made some changes to the MAX and the MCAS system. The MCAS system now has a maximum limit of one nose-down input during a single event of high angle of attack. The limit doesn’t reset if the pilots activate the electric trim switches. Further, an AOA sensor monitor was added to make sure MCAS doesn’t use AOA input if sensors disagree with each other by more than 5.5 degrees. The Flight Control Computer itself also no longer relies on a single sensor. Another important change is with the AOA DISAGREE alert. Previously, this alert was part of an optional AOA Gauge offered by Boeing. Now the AOA DISAGREE alert is always enabled, regardless of whether the airline has the option or not. All these changes are in the FAA summary."
Here's a quick, high level, run-down:
https://jalopnik.com/heres-everything-boeing-did-to-fix-the-...
"In practice, the MCAS system accepted readings from only a single angle of attack (AOA) sensor. In the event of a bad sensor reading, the MCAS initiated repeated nose-down inputs. The cockpit alarm for AOA disagreement was also an expensive upcharge.
So Boeing made some changes to the MAX and the MCAS system. The MCAS system now has a maximum limit of one nose-down input during a single event of high angle of attack. The limit doesn’t reset if the pilots activate the electric trim switches. Further, an AOA sensor monitor was added to make sure MCAS doesn’t use AOA input if sensors disagree with each other by more than 5.5 degrees. The Flight Control Computer itself also no longer relies on a single sensor. Another important change is with the AOA DISAGREE alert. Previously, this alert was part of an optional AOA Gauge offered by Boeing. Now the AOA DISAGREE alert is always enabled, regardless of whether the airline has the option or not. All these changes are in the FAA summary."
More detail in a Nytimes article of the flaws:
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/03/29/business/boei...