> We have a lot of different measures for intelligence when it comes to animals.
But there is an abismal difference between animal intelligence and human intelligence.
> predict next word <--> understanding
Yes, and I could say a stone understands the world because its state reflects the world: it gets hot, cold, wet, dry, radiated, whatever. Perhaps its internal state can even predict the world: if it's rolling downhill, it can predict that it will stop soon. But the stone is not conscious like a human, and neither is a clock nor a horse that can count to ten. The stone obviously is "reducing to the absurd" - a horse can actually "guess" to some degree, but nothing like a human. It cannot ask a question, and it cannot answer itself a question.
> I cannot stress that we should not represent this as a binary setting.
That was kind of my point, to eliminate the binary "no", leaving us with a spectrum.
My initial claim "these are just nutjobs" - my apologies for the phrasing - was addressing this: there are no people "without internal monologue AT ALL".
Since we seem to actually agree on this point, our difference is that I believe that the people with "little internal monologue" are simply not aware of it.
Let me phrase string it this way: If language is the understanding, then the internal monologue is not some quirky side effect. To understand something at the human level, we need to describe it with language, the rest are primitive instincts and "feelings".
We can model the past and the future. We can model ourselves in 10 years. And what is one of the most important things we would model? What we would say or think then - thinking being "saying something out silently in our head". Not really just feelings: "I would love my partner", sure but why? "Because . . .".
When we are utilizing language, the internal monologue, to construct the model, we cannot be "aware of it" constantly. That is, the bandwidth is taken by the tasks at hand that we are dealing with, it would be detrimental if every other phrase would be followed with "btw did I notice that I just understand this via a string of words?". The more complex actions or idea we process, the less aware we are that we are using language for it. That is "being in the flow". We can reconstruct it when done, and here, if there is a lack of awareness of internal monologue, it will be rationalized as something else.
> Or if you make the claim that we're all the same (I'd find that quite surprising tbh, especially given the nature of linguistics), you need to explain that too and your expected distribution that would claim that (narrow).
My explanation (without proof), is that it's just a matter of awareness.
> All I can tell you is that my friend and I have had this conversation multiple times over many years and it seems very constant to me. I have no reason to believe they are lying and if they are they are doing so with an extreme level of consistency, which would be quite out of the norm.
Can you think of some kind of tests question (or string of questions) that could prove either? I have been thinking about it obviously, but I can't come up with any way to empirically test that there is or is no internal monologue. Consistency could simply mean that their rationalization is consistent.
I'll leave you this article, which I found quite interesting: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43685072 The person lost language, and lost what we could consider human-level consciousness at the same time, and then recovered both at the same rate. Of course, there was brain damage, so it's not an empirical conclusion.
But there is an abismal difference between animal intelligence and human intelligence.
> predict next word <--> understanding
Yes, and I could say a stone understands the world because its state reflects the world: it gets hot, cold, wet, dry, radiated, whatever. Perhaps its internal state can even predict the world: if it's rolling downhill, it can predict that it will stop soon. But the stone is not conscious like a human, and neither is a clock nor a horse that can count to ten. The stone obviously is "reducing to the absurd" - a horse can actually "guess" to some degree, but nothing like a human. It cannot ask a question, and it cannot answer itself a question.
> I cannot stress that we should not represent this as a binary setting.
That was kind of my point, to eliminate the binary "no", leaving us with a spectrum.
My initial claim "these are just nutjobs" - my apologies for the phrasing - was addressing this: there are no people "without internal monologue AT ALL".
Since we seem to actually agree on this point, our difference is that I believe that the people with "little internal monologue" are simply not aware of it.
Let me phrase string it this way: If language is the understanding, then the internal monologue is not some quirky side effect. To understand something at the human level, we need to describe it with language, the rest are primitive instincts and "feelings".
We can model the past and the future. We can model ourselves in 10 years. And what is one of the most important things we would model? What we would say or think then - thinking being "saying something out silently in our head". Not really just feelings: "I would love my partner", sure but why? "Because . . .".
When we are utilizing language, the internal monologue, to construct the model, we cannot be "aware of it" constantly. That is, the bandwidth is taken by the tasks at hand that we are dealing with, it would be detrimental if every other phrase would be followed with "btw did I notice that I just understand this via a string of words?". The more complex actions or idea we process, the less aware we are that we are using language for it. That is "being in the flow". We can reconstruct it when done, and here, if there is a lack of awareness of internal monologue, it will be rationalized as something else.
> Or if you make the claim that we're all the same (I'd find that quite surprising tbh, especially given the nature of linguistics), you need to explain that too and your expected distribution that would claim that (narrow).
My explanation (without proof), is that it's just a matter of awareness.
> All I can tell you is that my friend and I have had this conversation multiple times over many years and it seems very constant to me. I have no reason to believe they are lying and if they are they are doing so with an extreme level of consistency, which would be quite out of the norm.
Can you think of some kind of tests question (or string of questions) that could prove either? I have been thinking about it obviously, but I can't come up with any way to empirically test that there is or is no internal monologue. Consistency could simply mean that their rationalization is consistent.
I'll leave you this article, which I found quite interesting: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43685072 The person lost language, and lost what we could consider human-level consciousness at the same time, and then recovered both at the same rate. Of course, there was brain damage, so it's not an empirical conclusion.
Also this book https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Origin_of_Consciousness_in... while partially debunked and being pop-sci to begin with, has wildly interesting insights into the internal monologue and at least draws extremely interesting questions.